

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	VC/NIC				
16	NIO/USSR		X		
17	C/ACIS/DI		X		
18	ER				
19					
20					
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SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

Executive Secretary

8 Aug 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

25X1

State Dept. review completed



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United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S

Executive Registry

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3116

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EUR - Rozanne L. Ridgway

SUBJECT: Gorbachev Testing Moratorium/Presidential Letter on
Our Testing Proposal

Sokolov brought me today a letter from Gorbachev to the President stating that they intend to announce a moratorium on nuclear testing for the period August 6 to next January 1 (Tab 1). As you know, we have been expecting something of this sort tied to Hiroshima and just before the NPT Review Conference, and the proposal for a Soviet calibration visit to our testing site has been developed as a counter. Our proposal was included in the draft letter to Gorbachev that none of us particularly liked.

With the Soviet letter -- and a probable announcement in Moscow today or tomorrow -- our problem now is one of timing. We need to get our proposal out immediately so we can announce it as a counter to the Soviet ploy. We believe this could be best done by sending a letter to Gorbachev this afternoon including the nuclear testing proposal only (Tab 2). It would not mention the Soviet letter, but would parallel it as a one-issue, pre-announcement notification. We believe this would be far preferable to a letter along the lines that was earlier proposed. We have discussed this by telephone with Mike. He agrees it would be useful to get our initiative out in some form, but he has not had a chance to review this memo.

Embassy Moscow could hand over the letter early tomorrow morning. We would then announce our proposal shortly after the Soviets announce theirs. At Tab 3 is a draft announcement that emphasizes the importance of our proposal and criticizes theirs in appropriately moderate terms. We have further Q & A's prepared on both subjects that can be used tomorrow.

I recommend you discuss this with Bud immediately on your return.

Drafted: EUR/SOV: BLP: 7/28/83 03769M
Cleared: EUR: MPalmer
PM: JHolmes

SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR

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EXEC
REG

C-128

drafted: EUR/SOV:BLPasco *h?*
7/28/85 x3350 (3763M)

cleared: EUR:MPalmer *h*
EUR:RLRidgway *h*



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Gorbachev Letter on Testing Moratorium

Soviet Chargé Sokolov delivered to Ambassador Ridgway a letter from Gorbachev to the President this afternoon announcing a unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing. According to the letter, which is attached, the moratorium is to last from August 6 to next January 1 and would be extended if the US "refrains from conducting nuclear explosions." The letter notes that this step will be announced publicly.

A Soviet announcement to begin a testing moratorium on the 40th Anniversary of Hiroshima and prior to the Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference had been widely expected. We are working appropriate press guidance in case the announcement is made today or early tomorrow, and are also considering how this affects our handling of our own nuclear testing initiative.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Gorbachev letter

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DECL:OADR

Unofficial translation

His Excellency

Ronald W. REAGAN

The President of the United States of America

July 28, 1985

Dear Mr. President,

I would like to inform you of the following.

Striving to promote cessation of the dangerous rivalry in building up nuclear arsenals and desiring to set a good example for other nuclear countries, the Soviet Union has taken a decision to cease unilaterally, starting August 6th, 1985, any nuclear explosions. Our moratorium is declared till January 1, 1986. However, it will continue to be in effect even longer if the United States, on its part, refrains from conducting nuclear explosions. All this will be contained in an official statement.

We hope, Mr. President, that the United States will duly appreciate this peace-loving step by the Soviet Union and will follow its example. A mutual Soviet-American moratorium would be an important contribution toward a healthier international situation and lessening the danger of war.

In taking this decision we proceeded, in particular, from our desire to promote a more favorable atmosphere in view of the forthcoming meeting between you and me in November as well.

I take this opportunity to wish you once again the speediest recovery.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

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~~ORIGINAL~~

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EUR/SOV:BLPASCOE:
7/28/85 632-7559 WANG 3766H
THE SECRETARY

EUR:HPALMER
EUR:RLRIDGWAY

NSC:RCMCFARLANE
S/S:

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

MODIS

E.O. 12356: OADR

TAGS: US, UR, PREL

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER ON NUCLEAR TESTING

GPS
BLP
HPC RCMF
RL S/S

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT

2. EMBASSY SHOULD TRANSMIT IMMEDIATELY, IN ANY CASE NO LATER THAN NOON MOSCOW TIME, TO HIGHEST AVAILABLE MFA OFFICIAL TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV IN PARA 3.

3. DEAR MR. GENERAL SECRETARY:

I AM PLEASED THAT WE HAVE NOW AGREED TO MEET IN GENEVA NOVEMBER 19 AND 20. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH YOU PRIVATELY ABOUT THE ISSUES AFFECTING OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE MEETING IN HELSINKI THIS WEEK BETWEEN SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE WILL PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN OUR DIALOGUE AND IN WORKING ON AN AGENDA OF ISSUES FOR OUR MEETING.

BEFORE EITHER OF THESE MEETINGS, THERE IS ONE ISSUE THAT I WOULD LIKE TO RAISE WITH YOU -- NUCLEAR TESTING. AS

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YOU KNOW, IN MY ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1984, I PROPOSED SEVERAL MEASURES THAT COULD HELP INCREASE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. AMONG THESE PROPOSALS, I ASKED THAT WE FIND A WAY FOR SOVIET EXPERTS TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES' TEST SITE, AND FOR OURS TO GO TO YOURS, TO MEASURE DIRECTLY THE YIELDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS.

SINCE MY ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS, I REGRET TO SAY, U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION IN THE MEASUREMENT OF NUCLEAR TEST YIELDS HAS NOT YET BEEN ACHIEVED. MOST RECENTLY, THE SOVIET UNION ALLEGED THAT THE U.S. NUCLEAR TEST OF APRIL 2, 1985 EXCEEDED THE 150 KILOTON THRESHOLD, AND THAT THE UNITED STATES DELIBERATELY TOOK STEPS TO PREVENT SOVIET NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION FROM ESTABLISHING THE TRUE YIELD OF THE EXPLOSION. I WISH TO ASSURE YOU, MR. GENERAL SECRETARY, THE YIELD OF THAT TEST WAS LESS THAN 150 KILOTONS, AND THE UNITED STATES TOOK NO STEPS TO INTERFERE WITH SOVIET NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

THE UNITED STATES HAS EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY ITS NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION THAT THE YIELD OF A NUMBER OF SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS HAS EXCEEDED 150 KILOTONS. YET, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION SAYS THAT THESE TESTS HAD YIELDS UNDER THAT LIMIT.

IT IS EVIDENT FROM OUR EXCHANGES ON THIS QUESTION THAT THERE ARE LARGE UNCERTAINTIES IN THE PROCEDURES USED BY BOTH SIDES TO ESTIMATE THE YIELDS OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS CONDUCTED BY THE OTHER SIDE. THESE UNCERTAINTIES CREATE MISTRUST THAT UNDERMINES THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS.

I TAKE THE SOVIET CONCERNS OVER U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH THE 150 KILOTON TESTING LIMIT VERY SERIOUSLY, AND BELIEVE THEY SHOULD BE RESOLVED PROMPTLY AND DEFINITELY. ACCORDINGLY, MR. GENERAL SECRETARY, I INVITE YOU TO SEND SOVIET TECHNICAL EXPERTS TO MEET WITH THEIR U.S. COUNTERPARTS TO DISCUSS AND REVIEW U.S. DATA OBTAINED FROM A DIRECT YIELD MEASUREMENT OF THE APRIL 2 TEST. I AM CONFIDENT THAT EXPERT SOVIET EXAMINATION OF THESE DATA WILL CONFIRM THAT THE YIELD OF THIS TEST WAS LESS THAN 150 KILOTONS. I AM WILLING TO HAVE SUCH A MEETING TAKE PLACE AT OR NEAR THE NEVADA TEST SITE TO ALLOW SOVIET EXPERTS TO INSPECT THE SITE OF THE APRIL 2 TEST.

I ALSO INVITE YOU TO SEND SOVIET TECHNICAL EXPERTS TO THE NEVADA TEST SITE TO MEASURE THE YIELD OF A U.S. NUCLEAR TEST. THE SOVIET EXPERTS ARE INVITED TO BRING WITH THEM

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ANY INSTRUMENTATION DEVICES YOU DEEM NECESSARY TO MEASURE THE YIELD OF THIS TEST. UPON YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THIS INVITATION, OUR EXPERTS CAN MEET WITHOUT DELAY TO SET A DATE AND MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS VISIT.

I AM MAKING THIS INVITATION WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS TO ENSURE THERE ARE NO OBSTACLES FROM THE U.S. SIDE TO ITS ACCEPTANCE. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A USEFUL STEP, IF IN THE MONTHS AHEAD WE CAN INITIATE INCREASED COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA.

MR. GENERAL SECRETARY, WE HAVE AN IMPORTANT, HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO PUT OUR RELATIONSHIP ON A SOUND FOOTING, SUSTAINABLE FOR THE LONG TERM. OUR AGENDA IS FULL OF PROPOSALS WHICH, IF REALIZED, CAN FORM THE SUBSTANCE OF A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP. I HOPE YOU WILL CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE PROPOSAL I HAVE MADE HERE TODAY. I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING WITH YOU IN NOVEMBER.

SINCERELY,
RONALD REAGAN

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White House/State Department Announcement

President Reagan's central arms control objective -- and the objective which the Soviets joined us in declaring in our joint statement in Geneva last January -- is to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. We, therefore, have proposed in Geneva radical reductions in existing stockpiles of these weapons, beginning with the most destabilizing ballistic missiles. We believe such radical reductions, coupled with a possible future strategic defense, are the most promising avenue to eliminate the danger of nuclear war. We regret that the Soviet Union to date has been unwilling to enter into concrete and detailed negotiations to achieve such reductions in Geneva.

We also believe that verifiable limitations on nuclear testing can play a useful, though more modest role. Limits on testing do not abolish the huge stockpiles of existing weapons but they can help to limit the destructive power of new weapons, if such limits are verifiable. For that reason, President Reagan, in his speech to the UN General Assembly on September 24, 1985, proposed that the Soviet Union and US exchange visits of experts to measure directly at nuclear test sites the yields of nuclear weapons tests. The President saw this proposal as a means to increase confidence in verifiable limits on testing. To date, the Soviet Union has refused to agree to this practical and fair-minded approach.

As a demonstration our seriousness and to go the extra mile, the President now has informed CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev that we are inviting a Soviet team to observe and to measure a nuclear test at our Nevada Test Site without preconditions. We believe that this new US initiative demonstrates our commitment to achieving verifiable limitations in nuclear testing.

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The Soviet Union also is announcing its own testing initiative -- a moratorium on testing effective August 6, 1985 until January 1, 1986. This type of proposal is of course not new. Such a moratorium was in effect from 1958 to 1961.

While we will examine the Soviet announcement carefully, we remain deeply concerned about the desirability of an uninspected testing moratorium, and the verifiability of restraints on nuclear tests, unless there are substantially improved verification provisions.

An uninspected moratorium on nuclear tests would not in any way address our very real compliance and verification concerns. We recall that it was the Soviets who first resumed testing after such a declared moratorium in 1961 with the largest series of high-yield nuclear explosions in history. President Kennedy noted then: "We know enough now ... never again to offer an uninspected moratorium."

We have noted in recent weeks a substantial acceleration in the number of Soviet nuclear weapons tests -- in the past week alone we have detected three such tests. Obviously this was designed to put the Soviet Union in a position not to need to test over the next five months.

We would welcome the Soviet interest in putting into place verifiable and durable limits on weapons testing. We believe the President's new initiative is the most practical approach to begin addressing this serious problem. Since there are no conditions to this offer, we look forward to a positive Soviet response.